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ON THE ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGY
OF TRUST
Ernst Fehr
University of Zurich
Abstract
In recent years, many social scientists have claimed that trust plays an important role in eco-
nomic and social transactions. Despite its proposed importance, the measurement and the
definition of trust seem to be not fully settled, and the identification of the exact role of trust
in economic interactions has proven to be elusive. It is still not clear whether trust is just an
epiphenomenon of good institutions or whether it plays an independent causal role capable of
shaping important aggregate economic outcomes. In this paper, I rely on a behavioral definition
of trust that enables us to relate it to economic primitives such as preferences and beliefs. I
review strong biological and behavioral evidence indicating that trusting is not just a special
case of risk-taking, but based on important forms of social preferences such as betrayal aver-
sion. Behaviorally defined trust also opens the door for understanding national and ethnic trust
differences in terms of differences in preferences and beliefs, and it suggests ways to examine
and interpret a causal role of trust. (JEL: A13, C90, D10, O10)
1. Introduction
Trust plays a role in almost all human relationships. It permeates friendship rela-
tions, family relations, and economic relations. People rely on the support of
their friends, children trust their parents, and sellers trust their buyers to pay the
bill. Thus, intuitively speaking, a social scientist has good reason to be inter-
ested in “trust” as a concept. Trust also seems particularly important in economic
exchanges because it seems obvious that the absence of trust among the trading
partners severely hampers market transactions.
During the last decade, there has been a surge of empirical research on trust.
The development of experimental tools for measuring trust (Camerer and Weigelt
1988; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993; Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995;
Kiyonari and Yamagishi 1996) and its determinants (Yamagishi 1998; Yamagishi,
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Kikuchi, and Kosugi 1999; Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004; Eckel and Wilson 2004;
Schechter 2006; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 2007; Houser, Schunk, and Winter
2008; Bohnet et al. 2008), as well as the availability of survey measures of trust
in international panel data sets greatly facilitated research on trust. They enabled
both the analysis of the impact of institutions on trust (e.g., Kollock 1994; Bohnet
and Huck 2004; Brown, Falk, and Fehr 2004) and cross-national comparisons of
trust (LaPorta et al. 1997; Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998; Buchan, Croson,
and Dawes 2002; Naef et al. 2008). In addition, aggregate measures of trust at
the country level have been related to important economic variables such as GDP
growth, inflation, or the volume of trade between countries; several papers sug-
gest that trust may be an important determinant of these variables. LaPorta et
al. (1997) show that a larger share of trusting people is negatively correlated
with inflation rates and positively correlated with GDP growth across countries.
Knack and Keefer (1997) report positive correlations between a measure of trust
and a country’s average annual GDP growth rate between 1980 and 1992. Zak and
Knack (2001) document similar correlations. More recently, Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2009) show that higher bilateral trust between two countries is asso-
ciated with more trade between the countries. In addition, this effect is stronger
for more trust intensive goods. The same authors (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
2004, 2008) also provide microeconomic evidence on the role of trust in finan-
cial markets. In their 2008 paper, for example, they document that less trusting
individuals are less likely to buy stock, and when they do so, they buy less of it.
The authors suggest that lack of individual trust in the stock market could partly
explain the “participation puzzle”; that is, why so few people take advantage of
the existence of a stock market.
Despite the wave of interesting and intriguing results on the role of trust, many
unanswered questions remain. There is no consensus on the proper definition
of trust and it is unclear in some of the literature how trust can be related to
more fundamental economic primitives such as preferences and beliefs. Both the
proper measurement of trust and the relationship between different measures of
trust also remain open issues. And, above all, it is unclear whether trust plays
an independent and sustainable causal role for important economic outcomes
such as the trading volume, the gains from trade, or the overall welfare of social
groups.
In this paper, I use a behavioral definition of trust that is based on Coleman
(1990). This definition is tightly connected with economic primitives such as
preferences and beliefs. I document the recent accumulation of strong evidence—
neurobiological (Baumgartner et al. 2008; Kosfeld et al. 2005), genetic (Reuter
et al. 2009) and behavioral (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004; Cox 2004; Hong and
Bohnet 2007; Bohnet et al. 2008)—that trusting cannot be captured by beliefs
about other people’s trustworthiness and risk preferences alone, but that social
preferences play a key role in trusting behavior. Betrayal aversion as documented
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in the work of Bohnet and coauthors seems to play a particularly important role
in trusting behavior. Betrayal aversion indicates an important departure from
how economists have viewed decision-making under risk in the past because
it suggests a fundamental distinction between risk constituted by asocial factors
and that based on interpersonal interactions. Intuitively speaking, people are more
willing to take risk when facing a given probability of bad luck than to trust when
facing an identical probability of being cheated. Betrayal aversion is thus a major
additional inhibitor of trusting behavior that adds importance to property rights
and contract enforcement institutions—regardless of whether they are legally or
informally constituted.
The behavioral definition of trust provides a neat organizing principle for the
very reason that it enables the researcher to provide an account of trusting behavior
in terms of beliefs about others’ trustworthiness, and in terms of risk preferences
and social preferences. I applied this definition to examine the determinants of
trust as measured in surveys. The results indicate that survey measures of trust
are predicted by risk preferences and measures of betrayal aversion as much as
behavioral measures of trust that are derived from the trust game. This finding
suggests that survey measures do not just capture beliefs about people’s trustwor-
thiness but are also influenced by the preferences of the survey respondents. In
addition, I show that risk and social preferences do not affect beliefs about others’
trustworthiness in a trust game. Thus, if one needs a clean measure of beliefs in
trustworthiness, one should ask respondents directly about the trustworthiness of
trustees in the trust game.
The paper also includes a short section which indicates that the proposed
concept of trust helps us understand differences in trust across countries and
ethnicities. Here I rely on the work of Naef et al. (2008), documenting a substantial
trust gap between the US and Germany which can be fully explained by differences
in the preferences and beliefs in the two populations.
Finally, I demonstrate that the belief component of trust is a notoriously
endogenous variable affected by the prevailing informal institutions. This fact
provides the starting point for the discussion about the causal effects of trust.
I argue that although it seems possible that optimistic beliefs about other peo-
ple’s trustworthiness have an independent role in causing different long-term
outcomes—relative to pessimistic initial beliefs—there is yet no fully convincing
evidence proving this claim. In this context, I discuss some of the papers which
examined the causal role of trust in field data. In my view, economists still lack
instrumental variables for trust that support causality claims beyond doubt. Thus,
the most important open questions in research on trust seems to be the lack of fully
convincing evidence supporting the notion that changes in trust cause sustainable
changes in important economic variables. But in my view, it is exactly this piece
of evidence that seems to be needed to justify social scientists’ massive interest
in trust.
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2. What Is Trust, and How Can We Measure It?
An individual (let’s call her the trustor or investor) trusts if she voluntarily places
resources at the disposal of another party (the trustee) without any legal commit-
ment from the latter. In addition, the act of trust is associated with an expectation
that the act will pay off in terms of the investor’s goals. In particular, if the trustee
is trustworthy the investor is better off than if trust were not placed, whereas
if the trustee is not trustworthy the investor is worse off then if trust were not
placed.
This definition of trust is based on Coleman (1990) and defines trust as a
behavior. Trust defined in this way can be neatly examined using experimen-
tal one-shot games played anonymously, such as the gift exchange game (Fehr,
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993), discussed in more detail in Section 7, or the trust
game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). Take, for example, the binary version
of the trust game Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) use, which will play a role in the
next section. In this game, both players have an initial endowment of $10 and the
investor only has two choices: to send her endowment to the trustee or to keep
it. If the investor sends the money, it is doubled so that the trustee receives $20,
giving him an overall amount of $30. The trustee also has only two choices: to
send back $15 or to send back only $8. Thus, this game is capable of capturing
behavior that meets our definition of trust. If the investor sends her endowment
to an anonymous trustee she voluntarily places resources at the trustee’s disposal
without any real commitment from the latter. And if the trustee is trustworthy,
the act of trust increases the investor’s payoff from $10 to $15, whereas if the
trustee is greedy (i.e., not trustworthy) the investor earns less than the initial
endowment.
This game also illustrates why a behavioral definition of trust captures the
essence of trust, which consists of the investor’s willingness to make herself
vulnerable to others’ actions (Hong and Bohnet 2007), whereas a purely belief-
based definition of trust misses this point. Suppose, for example, that two people,
A and B, differ in their beliefs about the trustee’s trustworthiness. In particular, A
believes that the trustee will pay back $15 with probability 0.3 while B believes
that this will occur with probability 0.4. Assume further that A makes herself
vulnerable by sending her endowment, while B keeps her endowment. If the
essence of trust consists in the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to others’
actions it makes sense to say that A trusts while B does not trust. However,
a purely belief-based definition of trust would express the opposite. Thus, our
intuitive notion of trust is one that is associated with the act of trusting.
This argument obviously does not mean that beliefs play no role in trust. If
trust is a behavior involving trusting acts, then it is shaped by our beliefs about
others’ trustworthiness as well as our willingness to accept the risks involved
in trusting acts. Thus, people’s risk preferences should play a role in trusting
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behavior—a proposition that has received empirical support in recent papers
(Karlan 2005; Schechter 2006).1
Although trust is best captured by behavioral measures of trust, no such
measures are available in many cases, and researchers have to rely on survey
measures of trust. The most frequently used measure is taken from the American
General Social Survey (GSS), which has measured trust annually since 1972,
and the World Values survey (WVS) which has been widely used to measure
cross-cultural differences in trust. Both surveys capture trust using the following
question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? The survey respondents can
answer in a binary way to this question by agreeing either with “Most people can
be trusted” or with “Can’t be too careful.”
Note that the question is very close to asking people about their behavioral
inclinations (“can’t be too careful”), and it seems quite likely that when people
answer this question, they consult either their own experiences and behaviors in
the past or introspect how they would behave in situations involving a social risk.
Therefore, it seems likely that the answer to the GSS and WVS question is not
only shaped by people’s beliefs about others’ trustworthiness, but also by their
own preferences towards taking social risks. In fact, one problem with this trust
measure is that it seems perfectly possible to agree with both answer categories
for the very reason that beliefs and preferences both influence trusting behavior. A
recent study (Miller and Mitamura 2003) pointed out that a risk-averse or cautious
person may share the view that “most people can be trusted” but that at the same
time prudence or risk aversion may induce the person to say “Can’t be too careful”
because the person is unwilling to accept small probability risks that have large
payoff consequences. Miller and Mitamura show that this “confound” is highly
problematic when this question is used to measure trust across cultures.
To rule out having reasonable people agree with both answer categories,
Miller and Mitamura (2003) propose “one-dimensional” questions that directly
distinguish between trust and distrust such as “Do you think that most people
can be trusted?” with answer categories on a 7-point Likert scale from “not at
all” (coded as 1) and “complete trust” (coded as 7). Similarly, the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) asks questions such as “In general, one can trust people”
with four answer categories (agree fully, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat,
disagree fully). In view of the problems inherent in the GSS question, these new
measures of trust are likely to be better.
One potential drawback of behavioral trust measures taken from the trust
game is that the investor may send money for purely altruistic reasons (Cox 2004).
1. I should add here that not all studies have found a link between risk preferences and trusting
behavior (Eckel and Wilson 2004; Houser, Schunk, and Winter 2008). I will comment on these
findings in the next section.
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These transfers might not be “trusting,” although they place resources at the dis-
posal of another party without any real commitment because the transfers are not
associated with an expectation of a back transfer that renders the investor bet-
ter off. There is little information about the strength of altruistic motives behind
first mover transfers in the trust game,2 but it does not seem all that plausible
that a first mover who knows nothing about the anonymous second mover except
that he has the same monetary endowment has altruistic feelings that induce him
to transfer resources to the unknown second mover.3 Nevertheless, controlling
for altruistic motives seems advisable (see Section 4) because they might affect
investors’ behavior. Controlling for altruism makes sense even if one only uses
survey measures of trust because if survey respondents derive their answers from
introspection into their own likely behaviors in situations requiring trust, then
one cannot rule out that altruism also affects survey measures of trust. If altruism
affects behavioral measures of trust then it also seems likely it will affect sur-
vey measures of trust. In Section 4, I will examine this conjecture in more depth
but before I can do this, a more complete description of the different types of
preferences that affect trusting is needed.
3. Is Trusting Just a Special Case of Risk Taking?
From the viewpoint of the standard economic model, it is tempting to model
situations involving trust just like situations involving risk or ambiguity. For
example, a rational and self-interested investor in the binary trust game of Bohnet
and Zeckhauser (2004) forms probability beliefs about the trustee’s actions and
chooses “trust” if the expected utility of the trusting act is larger than the expected
utility of “distrust.” From the perspective of the standard model, the source of the
risk is completely inessential, that is, it does not matter whether the risk is consti-
tuted through the uncertain behavior by the trustee, through a random mechanism
2. Cox (2004) argues that one can derive a pure measure of behavioral trust by taking the difference
between the first mover transfer in a trust game and what the person voluntarily gives in an otherwise
identical dictator game. It is not implausible, however, that the trust game puts subjects in a very
different mental frame compared to the dictator game. Whereas the trust game is likely to trigger a
social exchange frame (“If I trust you and you are trustworthy we are both better off”) the dictator
game may trigger a helping or generosity frame absent in the trust game. Therefore, the difference
between the transfers in the two games may understate behavioral trust.
3. There is evidence that a special form of altruistic preferences—the surplus-maximization
motive—plays a role in certain circumstances (Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel
2004; Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt 2006). This motive may directly induce first movers to send money
in the trust game because the transfer is usually doubled or tripled. However, it is easy to remove
the impact of this motive on investors’ behavior by implementing a game in which the first-mover
can only make a lump-sum transfer while the second-mover’s transfer increases the total surplus
available to the two players. The gift exchange game, described in more detail later, has exactly
these features. It rules out that the investor’s behavior is driven by his surplus-maximization motive.
Although it may still be the case that the investor anticipates the trustee’s surplus-maximization
motive, this does not pose a problem because rational trust should be based on a full assessment of
the trustee’s motives. Thus, the gift exchange game may provide a better measure of trust than the
trust game because it rules out the investors’ surplus-maximization motive.
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that determines the trustee’s behavior, or some other source of randomness.
However, as I will show subsequently, there is now strong neurobiological as
well as behavioral evidence indicating that this view is untenable.
3.1. Neurobiological Evidence
Kosfeld et al. (2005) conducted a version of the trust game with two groups of
subjects: one group inhaled a spray containing the uniquely mammalian neu-
ropeptide oxytocin, and the other group inhaled a placebo spray. The rationale for
this experiment originates in evidence indicating that oxytocin plays a key role
in certain prosocial approach behaviors in non-human mammals. For example,
in prairie voles, one of the important animal “models” in neuropeptide research,
oxytocin and vasopressin (a closely related neuropeptide) seem crucial in pair
bonding and monogamy (Insel and Young 2001). In their influential survey Insel
and Young (2007, p. 133) write:
Indeed, all the major behavioral aspects of monogamy can be facilitated in
the prairie vole by central injections of either oxytocin or vasopressin even in
voles that do not have the opportunity to mate. Conversely, these behaviors
are inhibited by either oxytocin or vasopressin antagonists given to prairie
voles just before mating. …Thus, in monogamous prairie voles oxytocin and
vasopressin seem to be necessary and sufficient for pair bond formation.
The formation of a long-term pair bond—sometimes tantamount to marriage
in humans—can be viewed as a decision that involves substantial relation-specific
investments and is therefore subject to risks because these investments are of little
value outside the relationship. Thus, these neuropeptides might make animals—
and people—more willing to take such social risks.
Another example of oxytocin’s role in prosocial approach behavior comes
from rats. In rats, as in many mammals, females have a natural avoidance of
neonates, in particular of neonate odors. The onset of maternal behavior thus
requires overcoming these natural tendencies to reject the newborn. Interestingly,
lesions that inhibit olfactory processing in female rats facilitate the onset of mater-
nal care (Fleming and Rosenblatt 1974), as does oxytocin. The neuropeptide is
released centrally during parturition and is thought to decrease the firing rate of
cells in the bulb, which then decreases olfactory processing. These results led
researchers to hypothesize that oxytocin may be important for the transition from
avoidance to approach of the young (Insel and Young 2001). Note that the will-
ingness to provide maternal care involves high costs and risks because it makes
the female animal more vulnerable to predators.
Based on the animal literature, Kosfeld et al. (2005) hypothesized that oxy-
tocin might cause humans to exhibit more behavioral trust as measured in the
trust game. In principle, it could have also been possible that the neuropeptide
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causes higher backtransfers in the trust game. For this reason, both investors and
trustees were randomly assigned to a placebo and an oxytocin group. The subjects
received placebo or oxytocin with a nasal spray because it is known that neuropep-
tides gain access to the brain by this method (Heinrichs and Domes 2008). Each
investor participated in four independent trust games with four different trustees.
Feedback about the trustees’ behavior was only given at the end of the fourth
game. The investors could invest 0, 4, 8, or 12 money units in the trustee. The
amount sent was tripled and added to the trustees’ endowment of 12. Then the
trustee could send back whatever he wanted to. Figure 1a shows that the investors
in the oxytocin group indeed sent more money to the trustees. The percentage of
subjects who show maximal trust in all four games is, in particular, considerably
higher in the oxytocin group.
This result raises several questions. First, did oxytocin increase subjects’ trust
by creating more optimistic beliefs? Second, did it make subjects generally more
prosocial, that is, did it increase trust as well as the trustees’ trustworthiness, or did
it only increase trust? Figure 1b shows that oxytocin had no effect on investors’
beliefs. In fact, for any given transfer level, investors’ average belief about the
trustees’ back transfer is higher in the placebo condition, although the difference
is not significant.
If beliefs remain unaffected, it must be the case that oxytocin influences
behavior by affecting subjects’ preferences. However, oxytocin did not make
the trustees more willing to send back money, which rules out that it makes
people indiscriminately more prosocial (see Figure 1c). Therefore, the higher
level of trust the investors exhibit is unlikely to be the result of a generally
higher level of niceness or generosity because this should also have raised the
back-transfers.
But because risk preferences are predicted to shape trusting behavior, oxy-
tocin also might have made people more risk-seeking. To check this possibility,
Kosfeld et al. conducted risk experiments that were identical to the trust exper-
iment except for the fact that there was no trustee. Instead, subjects faced a
computer which mimicked the trustees’ behavior in trust games played previously.
The subjects in the risk experiment had exactly the same investment opportuni-
ties as in the trust game and they received vague (ambiguous) information about
the likely behavior of the computer, information that was intended to mimic the
vagueness of investors’ information in the trust game. The results of the risk game
showed that oxytocin did not affect the investors’ behavior, suggesting that the
neuropeptide affects some other preference component than risk or ambiguity
preferences. A second risk experiment reinforces this conclusion. After the end
of the risk game isomorphic to the trust game, subjects made 12 decisions involv-
ing binary lotteries that varied the probability of winning and the prizes in case of
winning or losing. Kosfeld et al. (2005) found no significant difference between
the placebo and the oxytocin group in any of the 12 lotteries.
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Figure 1. (a) The distribution of trust in the oxytocin and the placebo group. (b) Investors’ beliefs
about back transfers in the oxytocin and the placebo group. (c) Trustees’ backtransfers in the oxytocin
and the placebo group.
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These results suggest that neurophysiological mechanisms affect subjects’
preferences in the trust game, but that these preferences are distinct from those
towards risk or ambiguity. In other words, trust-taking is not just a special case
of risk-taking or decision-making under ambiguity. There must thus be some
preference components that the concept of risk or ambiguity preferences can-
not capture. One natural candidate for the missing preference type is social
preferences because some categories of social preferences imply a special aver-
sion towards trusting. Inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), for example,
implies that the inequality the investor experiences if he faces an untrustworthy
trustee reduces his utility beyond that merely associated with the reduction in
income. Likewise, theories of reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004;
Falk and Fischbacher 2006) imply that subjects derive extra disutility from
non-reciprocated trust. Thus, these theories of social preferences imply a kind
of special aversion against being a sucker or being exploited by untrustwor-
thy partners. Kosfeld et al. (2005), therefore, tentatively conclude that oxytocin
affects the neurophysiological mechanisms that underlie these kinds of social
preferences.
The interpretation that trust taking involves neurophysiological mechanisms
(or neural activity) beyond those needed to account for risk and ambiguity pref-
erences received further support in a follow-up study (Baumgartner et al. 2008).
This study examines the differences in the neural circuitry involved in trust and
(isomorphic) risk taking in subjects with placebo and oxytocin. In contrast to
Kosfeld et al. (2005), the new study has a within subject design and focuses on
subjects’ trust and risk taking after they experienced relatively low back trans-
fers in the trust game or low investment success in the risk game. The study
shows that oxytocin selectively deactivates neural circuitry known to be involved
in fear processing in the trust game (relative to the risk game). More specifi-
cally, oxytocin deactivates neural activity in the amygdala and midbrain regions
in the trust game relative to the activation levels observed in the risk game. In
addition, this deactivation in fear circuitry is associated with a differential behav-
ioral response to the meager feedback information in the trust and risk game.
While the subjects in the risk game reduce their investments after they expe-
rienced limited investment success, subjects in the trust game (who received
exactly the same feedback regarding the payoffs associated with their invest-
ments) keep their investment at pre-feedback levels. Thus, as in Kosfeld et al.,
oxytocin selectively affects trust taking, but we can also infer from the new study
that this behavioral effect is associated with selective deactivation in fear circuitry.
This study, therefore, supports the notion that social risk taking (i.e., trusting)
involves neural mechanisms that go beyond what is needed for taking asocial
risks.
Reuter et al. (2009) provide another fascinating piece of neurobiologi-
cal evidence. These authors examined behavior in a trust and a risk game.
Fehr Economics and Biology of Trust 245
They show that subjects who have a particular variant of the oxytocin recep-
tor gene exhibit more trust taking than those who exhibit the alternative variant
of the gene. In addition, subjects with the trust enhancing gene variant do
not behave differently in the risk game, nor do they display more trustwor-
thiness, suggesting that the gene variant does not generally increase prosocial
behavior. The results of Reuter et al. suggest that the distinction between
social and asocial risk taking is indeed fundamental, as it even seems to
be encoded in our genes. These results are also consistent with recent find-
ings in a twin study (Cesarini et al. 2008) that suggest that trust is partially
heritable.
3.2. Behavioral Evidence
The conclusion that trust-taking differs significantly from behavior towards non-
socially constituted risks also receives strong support from recent papers by
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Bohnet et al. (2008). The main tool in their
studies is the binary trust game described in Section 2. But instead of sim-
ply allowing the investors to make a decision to trust or distrust, they elicit
the investors’ minimum acceptance probability (MAP), which provides a much
more complete picture of their behavior in the trust game. The MAP is the
minimum percentage of trustees who need to choose the trustworthy action to
induce the investor to trust. Thus, if the investor chooses a MAP of 0.7 but the
actual share of trustworthy trustees turns out to be less than 0.7, the chosen
MAP implies that the investor will not trust. If, instead, the actual share of trust-
worthy trustees exceeds 0.7, the chosen MAP implies that the investor trusts.
Note that telling the truth in this game is a weakly dominant strategy for the
investors because they cannot gain anything from misrepresenting the MAP rel-
ative to their true MAP, whereas misrepresentation can result in losses because
they do not know the actual share of trustworthy trustees. If, for example, a
subject’s true MAP is 0.4 whereas he or she states a MAP of 0.6, his or her
expected utility is reduced if the actual share of trustworthy people turns out to
be 0.5.
To control for risk aversion, Bohnet et al. (2008) also collect data from a
non-interactive decision problem with exactly the same material payoffs as in the
trust game. The only difference is that there is no trustee in the decision problem
who makes a decision and earns payoffs. Instead, the investor simply faces the
choice between a sure payoff of 10 or a lottery L = {15 with probability p and
8 with (1 − p)}. Similar to the trust game, the investors have to state a MAP,
which in the decision problem is just the minimum probability with which the
payoff of 15 has to occur in order for the subject to be willing to choose the
lottery. Because a risk-neutral investor will state a MAP of 2/7, the deviation
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of the actually stated MAP from 2/7 provides information about investors’ risk
preferences.4 In particular, if subjects’ MAP in the decision problem (MAPDP)
is larger than 2/7, the subject is risk-averse.
If subjects’ MAP in the trust game (MAPTG) is higher than MAPDP, we can
infer that there are trust-inhibiting preference components that cannot be captured
by risk preferences alone. Bohnet et al. (2008) conducted these experiments in
six different countries (Brazil, Oman, China, Switzerland, Turkey, and the US).
The average MAPDP in all countries is significantly larger than 2/7, indicating
that risk aversion plays an important role in the decision problem. However, we
also observe in all countries that the average MAPTG is higher than the average
MAPDP, suggesting that risk preferences cannot tell the whole story in the trust
game.
To gain deeper insights into the nature of the additional preference component
that inhibits trusting behavior, the authors also conducted a so-called risky dictator
game. This game is identical to the trust game, except that a random mechanism,
rather than the trustee him or herself, determines the trustee’s choice. Thus, there
is still a trustee in this game who receives the payoffs but the trustee cannot make
a decision; instead a random mechanism makes the “choice.” This means that
outcome-based social preferences can still play a role in the risky dictator game
but betrayal aversion, namely, the pure disutility of experiencing or anticipating
non-reciprocated trust, is ruled out because the trustee has no opportunity to
reciprocate in this game. The difference between MAPTG and the MAP in the
risky dictator game (MAPRDG) is, therefore, a measure of betrayal aversion.
Bohnet et al. (2008) find that betrayal aversion exists in all six countries and is—
averaging across the six countries—as important as risk aversion. These results
thus provide strong evidence that not only risk aversion, but betrayal aversion as
well, constrain behavior towards inter-personal risks.5
If betrayal aversion is important for trust, then risk preferences alone might
have little explanatory power for elucidating trusting behavior in the trust game.
4. The expected utility of L is 15p + 8(1 − p), which is equal to 10 if p = 2/7. Subjects did
not know the actual probability p with which the outcome 15 was chosen. Due to this uncertainty,
stating the true MAP in the decision problem is incentive compatible.
5. Currently it is an open question whether betrayal aversion is just a variant of preferences for
reciprocity or whether additional motivational forces that go beyond reciprocity preferences are
needed to explain betrayal aversion. However, as the material allocations in the risky dictator game
and the trust game are identical, the behavioral evidence implies that people care about how an
allocation is reached (i.e., whether bad luck or selfish human behavior is the source of a potentially
bad outcome). Bohnet et al. (2008) find no evidence for the role of outcome-based social preferences
for behavioral trust (perhaps because the effects of inequality aversion and surplus maximization
cancel each other in the aggregate) but Hong and Bohnet (2007) show that inequity aversion is an
inhibitor of trust in lower-status groups of the US population (women, minorities, young adults, and
non-Protestants) whereas higher-status groups (men, Caucasians, middle-aged people, and Protes-
tants) display betrayal aversion. Thus, as in Bellemare, Kröger, and Van Soest (2008), the relative
importance of outcome and intention-based social preferences seems to vary across socio-economic
groups.
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If researchers cannot control for betrayal aversion, regressions of first-mover
behavior in the trust game on measures of risk preferences suffer from a lot of
noise and omitted variable bias, possibly preventing significant results in smaller
samples. This may explain why some researchers have not found an impact of
risk preferences on trust (Eckel and Wilson 2004; Houser, Schunk, and Winter
2008). In fact, the evidence in Houser, Schunk, and Winter can be taken as indirect
support for betrayal aversion because the authors find that their measure of risk
preferences has excellent predictive power for behavior in risk games but not in
trust games.
The existence of betrayal aversion is likely to be very important for institu-
tional design questions because some of the most important risks that people
face in their economic activities are socially constituted, such as the risk of
being cheated by the trading partner or the risk of expropriation by politicians
or corrupt civil servants. Thus, the existence of betrayal aversion is likely to be
a potent inhibitor of trade and economic activity which renders the design and
implementation of efficient legal enforcement institutions all the more important.
4. Do Risk and Social Preferences Predict Survey Trust?
If betrayal and risk aversion are determinants of trust, they should have predictive
power in trust regressions. I examine this question with data from the German
SOEP which contains survey measures of trust, betrayal aversion, and risk pref-
erences.6 Trust is measured with three questions: (i) “In general, one can trust
people,” (ii) “Nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody,” and (iii) “When dealing
with strangers, it is better to be cautious before trusting them.” In all three cases
the answer categories are “disagree strongly,” “disagree somewhat,” “agree some-
what,” and “agree strongly.” I code the answers to questions (i)–(iii) in such a way
that a higher number always represents higher trust.
Betrayal aversion means that people dislike non-reciprocated trust. It is
plausible that people who experience particularly high disutility from non-
reciprocated trust have a high willingness to punish non-reciprocating players. The
reverse also makes sense: people with a strong preference for negative reciprocity
(i.e., a preference for punishing non-reciprocal behavior) are, ceteris paribus, more
likely to feel betrayed in case of non-reciprocated trust. Measures of negative
reciprocity should therefore be good proxies for betrayal aversion. The German
SOEP provides such a measure based on two questions taken from the Reciprocity
questionnaire (Perugini et al. 2003): (i) “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take
6. This section relies heavily on the ideas developed in Naef et al. (2008). In particular, the measures
of betrayal aversion and altruism have been developed in this paper. However, Naef et al. (2008) use
these variables to explain the behavioral trust gap between the US and Germany whereas the purpose
of this section is to show that survey trust is also affected by risk preferences and social preferences.
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revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the costs” and (ii) “If someone offends
me, I will also offend him/her.” People answer these questions on a Likert Scale
from 1–7.
The SOEP also contains an experimentally validated measure of risk pref-
erences which is based on the question: “Are you, generally speaking, a person
who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?” The
respondents can answer this question on an 11-point Likert Scale ranging from
0 (very risk-averse) to 10 (very risk-seeking). A recent paper shows (Dohmen
et al. 2005) that this measure of risk preferences is a good predictor of behavior
in risk-taking experiments.
Finally, because altruism may affect measures of trust, I also include a mea-
sure of altruism or generosity as an explanatory variable. The SOEP has a question
that provides information regarding the frequency with which people volunteer
for clubs or social services: “How do you spend your free time? Please indi-
cate how often you engage on average in each of the following activities.” The
menu of possible activities ranges from meeting friends, relatives, or neighbors,
to watching TV or videos, to volunteering in clubs and social services. Answer
categories include “never, seldom, monthly, weekly, or daily.” I include a dummy
into the regression that takes the value of zero if the respondent never volunteers
and a value of 1 otherwise. The volunteering variable may not only indicate a
subject’s altruism, but his or her sociability as well. I thus also include a direct
“sociability” variable, as I am interested in the altruistic component of volunteer-
ing: subjects who meet “friends, neighbors, or relatives” at least daily or weekly
are considered sociable because of their frequent “out-of-family” social contacts.
This control for sociability increases the chances that the volunteering measure
picks up other-regarding concerns.
Table 1 shows how these preference measures affect the answers to each of
the trust questions and to the average answer across all three questions. The table
indicates robustly that risk preferences, betrayal aversion, and altruistic concern
expressed through volunteering significantly affect trust. Regardless of which
trust measure I use, subjects who exhibit high risk aversion trust less compared to
those who show intermediate risk aversion, and the latter trust less than those who
indicated a very low level of risk aversion. Likewise, subjects with high betrayal
aversion trust less than those with intermediate levels, who in turn trust less than
those with low levels of betrayal aversion. It is also interesting that the coefficients
on betrayal aversion are even larger than those on risk aversion, suggesting that
it is of substantial importance in trust. Controlling for sociability, subjects who
never volunteer are also less likely to trust others, suggesting that other-regarding
concerns affect trust measures.
I introduce demographic and socio-economic controls in Table 2. This some-
what reduces the coefficients of our preference measures, but most of them remain
significant. Our preference measures, in particular, continue to robustly affect our
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Table 1. The role of risk preferences and social preferences for survey trust.
In general, one Nowadays you When dealing
Dependent variable Trust index can trust people can’t rely on … with strangers…
Risk aversion: high −0.16*** −0.09*** −0.11*** −0.17***
(Base: low) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Risk aversion: medium −0.07*** −0.04** −0.05*** −0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Betrayal aversion: high −0.36*** −0.33*** −0.32*** −0.16***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Betrayal aversion: medium −0.11*** −0.11*** −0.13*** −0.00
(Base: low) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dummy for volunteering 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dummy for sociability 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.05** 0.03 0.04* 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 18732 18732 18732 18732
Adjusted-R2 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02
Notes: OLS-Regression of trust on measures of risk aversion, betrayal aversion, and altruism (robust standard error
in parentheses). We also performed ordered probit regressions which are not reported. They yield the same conclusions,
namely, risk aversion, betrayal aversion, and volunteering affect our trust measures significantly. All trust measures are
taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel. They are standardized so that they have mean zero and a standard deviation
of 1, implying that the regression coefficients provide information about how many standard deviations trust changes if
the independent variable changes by one unit. The trust index takes averages of the answers to all three trust questions. We
partition the risk and betrayal aversion measure into three categories: high aversion, medium aversion and low aversion.
Risk aversion is “high” if respondents circle 0–3 on the Likert Scale, “medium” if they circle 4–6 and “high” if subjects
choose 7–10. Betrayal aversion is “high” if respondents circle on average 6-7 on the Likert Scale for negative reciprocity, it
is medium for 3–5 and we classify a subject as “low” betrayal-averse if he chooses 1-2 on the Likert Scale. The volunteering
variable is a dummy that takes a value of zero if subjects never volunteer and a value of 1 otherwise. This regression does
not control for demographic and socio-economic influences on trust, but it controls for “sociability” which is a dummy
variable with value 1 if the respondent meets at least daily or weekly with “friends, relatives, or neighbors.”
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
average trust measure (“trust index”), probably because the trust index provides
a less noisy measure of trust than the individual measures.
5. Disentangling Behavioral Trust and Beliefs About Trustworthiness
If we want to understand trust there is a need to distinguish between beliefs in
others’ trustworthiness and trusting behavior. In the trust game this distinction
is straightforward. The investor’s transfer constitutes the behavioral measure and
by eliciting the investors’ belief about the trustee’s trustworthiness we have a
separate belief measure. However, how should we interpret survey measures of
trust? Are they a behavioral measure of trust or do they just represent people’s
beliefs about others’ trustworthiness? A priori, it seems plausible to assume that
the answer to the statement “In general, one can trust people” elicits people’s
beliefs about others’ trustworthiness. However, the results of Tables 1 and 2 call
this into question. The fact that risk and social preferences significantly predict
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survey measures of trust is consistent with the idea that people derive their answers
to trust questions from introspecting on their own likely behaviors in situations
requiring trust. Therefore, the survey measures of trust that are currently used are
also likely to reflect a composite of preferences and beliefs.
This does not mean of course that survey measures are better behavioral mea-
sures than the observed trusting behavior itself, that is, observation of investors’
behavior in the trust game. Observing actual trusting behaviors towards unknown
strangers will probably always provide a more convincing measure than answers
to a question.7 In addition, participation in the trust game requires that the game
is explained in detail so that subjects know all contingencies. Such detail is
typically not available when simple questions are posed, implying that less is
known about the subjects’ implicit assumptions. In addition, the trust game offers
the possibility of a clean separation between the act of trusting and the assess-
ment of the trustee’s trustworthiness because the investor in the trust game is
put into a specific situation that asks for two well-defined responses: an action
response and a belief response. In contrast, the belief component of trust and the
preference component are inextricably interwoven in the currently used survey
questions.
However, if beliefs about others’ trustworthiness were equally affected by
preference measures as the investors’ back transfer or survey measures of trust,
one could doubt whether the trust game enables a clean separation between behav-
ioral trust and expected trustworthiness. Therefore, we examine next whether
subjects’ beliefs in the trust game are predicted by their risk and social preferences.
Fortunately, Naef et al. (2008) collected a large data set that provides a nation-
ally representative behavioral trust measure for the US and Germany and an
equally representative measure of beliefs in the trustees’ trustworthiness. In total,
more than 1,400 investors participated in this experiment. I present the impact of
risk preferences and social preferences on the beliefs of the German and the US
population in the trust game in Table 3. Naef et al. asked the investors about their
beliefs about the trustees’ back transfers at investments of 0, 5, and 10.8 The table
7. Naef and Schupp (2008) found that questionnaire measures of trust—even those not subject to
the same criticism as the GSS measure—seem to be affected by social desirability bias, whereas
behavioral measures of trust are not affected. The German SOEP survey takes advantage of the fact
that a representative subsample of the German population participated in a trust game for several
years. The same people who participated in the experiment also answered survey questions on
trust and questions designed to measure social desirability bias. The advantage of the behavioral
trust measure could be due to the fact that the usual experimental economics care was applied
in creating an unobtrusive situation for the participants in the trust game. In particular, while the
individual SOEP interviewers did not know the SOEP participants’ decisions in the trust game, no
interviewer–participant anonymity existed with regard to the answers to the survey questions.
8. The subjects in Naef et al. (2008) played the following modified trust game. Both players were
endowed with 10 (in Germany) or $10 (in the US). Each subject could transfer between 0 and 10
money units to the “partner.” The investor’s transfer and the trustee’s back-transfer was doubled.
These modifications simplified the game which was important in view of the constraints imposed on
nationally representative games that are embedded in a survey.
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Table 2. The role of preferences and socio-economic factors for survey trust.
In general, Nowadays you When dealing
Trust one can can’t rely with
Dependent variable (std) index trust people on … strangers ….
Risk aversion: high −0.09*** −0.07*** −0.04** −0.09***
(Base: low) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Risk aversion: medium −0.04** −0.03* −0.03 −0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Betrayal aversion: high −0.30*** −0.28*** −0.27*** −0.13***
(Base: low) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Betrayal aversion: medium −0.10*** −0.10*** −0.13*** −0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dummy for volunteering 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dummy for sociability 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dummy of being a female 0.01 0.03* 0.03* −0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age: 18 – 30 (Base: 31 – 50) 0.07*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age: 51 – 92 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.04* -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Household income: 2nd quartile 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.03
(Base: 1st quartile) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Household income: 3rd quartile 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Household income: 4th quartile 0.37*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.21***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Household size −0.02*** −0.01* −0.01 −0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Head of household 0.04** 0.03 0.05*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lives in a 1− to 2−family house 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education: high school 0.06*** 0.03 0.07*** 0.02
(Base: less than high school) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education: more than high school 0.30*** 0.16*** 0.29*** 0.23***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Employment status: unemployed −0.17*** −0.17*** −0.15*** −0.07**
(Base: Employed) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Employment status: self-employed 0.02 −0.04 −0.03 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Employment status: retired −0.02 0.05** −0.00 −0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Employment status: non-labor market 0.07*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant −0.29*** −0.26*** −0.31*** −0.08*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 18509 18509 18509 18509
Adjusted-R2 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.04
Notes: OLS-Regression of trust on measures of risk aversion, betrayal aversion, and altruism (robust standard error
in parentheses). We also performed ordered probit regressions which are not reported. They yield the same conclusions,
namely, risk aversion, betrayal aversion, and volunteering affect our trust measures significantly. All trust measures are
taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel. They are standardized so that they have mean zero and a standard deviation
of 1. The trust index takes averages of the answers to all three trust questions. Our preference measures displayed in Table
2 are explained in more detail in Table 1.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
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Table 3. The impact of risk preferences and social preferences on investors’ beliefs about the
trustees’ back-transfers in the trust game.
Expected Expected
back-transfer back-transfer
if investor if investor Average expected
Dependent Variable transfers five transfers ten back-transfer
Dummy of being a US resident 0.32*** 1.04*** 0.34***
(0.11) (0.21) (0.10)
Risk aversion: high −0.14 −0.31 −0.16
(Base: low) (0.13) (0.25) (0.13)
Risk aversion: medium 0.03 −0.26 −0.05
(0.11) (0.22) (0.11)
Betrayal aversion: high 0.06 0.00 −0.18
(Base: low) (0.21) (0.40) (0.19)
Betrayal aversion: medium 0.05 0.11 0.00
(0.10) (0.19) (0.10)
Dummy for volunteering −0.04 0.42** 0.01
(0.10) (0.20) (0.10)
Dummy for sociability 0.11 0.30 0.10
(0.10) (0.20) (0.10)
Constant 4.08*** 6.30*** 3.99***
(0.15) (0.28) (0.14)
Observations 1423 1423 1423
Adjusted-R2 0.01 0.04 0.01
Notes: OLS-Regression of US and German investors’ beliefs about the trustees’ back-transfers on measures of risk
aversion, betrayal aversion, and altruism (robust standard error in parentheses). We also performed ordered probit regres-
sions which are not reported. They yield the same conclusions, namely, the preference measures have no significant impact
on subjects’ beliefs. The data are taken from Naef et al. (2008) who conducted nationally representative trust games in
Germany and the US. The regressions are based on the pooled data.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
shows the results of regressions with the expected back transfers as the dependent
variable. The same measures of risk preferences and social preferences are used
as in Table 1 and 2. Table 3 shows that the preference measures have basically no
impact on the investors’ beliefs in the trust game—the coefficients for risk and
betrayal aversion in all regressions have no significant impact on beliefs. Thus,
in contrast to the questionnaire measures of trust, which are likely to be driven
by an unknown mixture of belief and preference components, preferences do not
affect the belief measure from the behavioral trust experiment. This finding is
good news for a rational choice approach towards trust because such an approach
relies on the fundamental distinction between beliefs and preferences. According
to this approach, preferences and beliefs drive trusting behavior, but preferences
should not affect beliefs, otherwise they cannot be considered rational. Of course,
the absence of a preference influence on beliefs is not sufficient for the existence
of rational beliefs, but it is an important necessary condition.
Although risk and social preferences do not affect beliefs, they influence
investors’ actions. Naef et al. (2008) show that the preference measures used in
Tables 1–3 significantly affect investors’ trust in the trust game. In particular,
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people who display high betrayal aversion send less money to the trustee than
those who display medium betrayal aversion, and the latter send less than those
who display little betrayal aversion. The same qualitative order of effects holds
for risk aversion. In addition, the subjects’ beliefs about the trustworthiness of
their anonymous trustee determine the amount sent. These results reinforce our
claim that risk preferences, social preferences, and beliefs shape trust simultane-
ously. Taken together, the trust game thus enables us to achieve what we want. It
provides a suitable behavioral measure of trust and it provides the opportunity to
elicit a clean—preference-free—measure of beliefs about the trustworthiness of
anonymous strangers.
6. Explaining National and Ethnic Trust Differences
To what extent does the framework laid out in the previous sections help us under-
stand national and ethnic trust differences? Or put differently, do differences in
beliefs and preferences across nations and ethnic groups drive national and ethnic
trust differences? Or are other factors, such as the socio-economic differences
between nations and ethnic groups, the main drivers of differences in trusting
behavior?
Naef et al. (2008) applied the preferences and beliefs framework to their repre-
sentative trust data. They found that Americans display a much higher trust level in
the trust game compared to the German population. In addition, they observed that
African Americans show a much lower level of trust than Caucasian Americans.
The question then is whether the preferences and beliefs framework is capable
of explaining a substantial part of these trust differences. For this purpose, Naef
et al. examined the distribution of risk and social preference in the US and in
Germany on the basis of the preference measures described in Section 4. The key
findings can be summarized as follows: (i) The US population is significantly less
risk-averse and less betrayal-averse than the German population. (ii) The US pop-
ulation is also significantly more altruistic in terms of the volunteering measure
described herein. (iii) Finally, the US population also has significantly more opti-
mistic beliefs about the trustworthiness of the trustees.9 Therefore, if risk prefer-
ences, social preferences, and beliefs about the anonymous partner’s trustworthi-
ness affect trusting behavior, the preferences and belief differences across the two
countries should also explain the trust gap across countries. And they do. Naef et
al. show that differences in preferences and beliefs can explain the entire trust gap
between Germany and the US. Interestingly, the importance of preferences and
beliefs shows up even if the authors control for a host of socio-economic variables.
9. Note that US, investors faced trustees from the US, and German investors faced trustees from
Germany. Thus, the beliefs about the back transfers reflect beliefs about the average trustworthiness
of the respective populations.
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If the preferences and belief measures and the socio-economic measures are simul-
taneously used as explanatory variables, the preferences and beliefs variables still
explain roughly 90% the trust gap, and socio-economic variables explain the rest.
The approach in Naef et al. can also be applied to explain the trust gap between
African Americans and Caucasian Americans. It turns out that African Americans
have significantly more betrayal aversion than Caucasians, although there are no
differences in terms of risk aversion. However, African Americans are much
less optimistic about the trustees’ behavior. Taken together, ethnic differences in
betrayal aversion and beliefs about trustworthiness account for roughly two-thirds
of the black–white trust gap.
7. Trust As an Endogenous Variable—The Trust Shaping Role of
Informal Institutions
It is standard practice in economics to assume that preferences are given exoge-
nously, while the prevailing equilibrium determines beliefs endogenously. In order
to justify this view, it is not necessary to assume that preferences are completely
fixed because they may change over long periods of time. All that is needed is
that preferences are stable relative to the economic problem under investigation.
Beliefs, in contrast, are likely to be more malleable so that they change more
quickly in response variations in the prevailing conditions.
If we apply the standard view to problems involving trust, we must conclude
that trust is a partly endogenous and a partly exogenous variable, endogenous
to the extent that people’s beliefs shape it and exogenous in the scope that their
preferences influence it. The likely endogeneity of trust poses a major problem for
field studies investigating the causal impact of trust on economic variables such as
investment or trading volume, gross national product, and so on. I will deal with
this question in the next section. In this section I demonstrate the endogeneity
of trust with the help of the experiments that examined the impact of reputation
formation opportunities on markets with moral hazard problems (Brown, Falk,
and Fehr 2004).10
Subjects in these experiments are randomly allocated to two treatments: a one-
shot gift exchange treatment and a gift exchange treatment with an opportunity for
reputation formation. The basic gift exchange design has the following features.
Some subjects are in the role of an employer, others in the role of workers.
There are more workers than employers, and each employer can only employ
one worker. Employers offer employment contracts in a one-sided continuous
auction; an offer stipulates a wage offer and a requested effort level for the current
10. There are several experimental papers which document the endogeneity of trust and the role of
institutions in trust formation (see, e.g., Bohnet and Huck 2004; Bohnet and Baytelman 2007; Huck,
Lünser, and Tyran 2007).
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period. At the beginning of each of 15 periods, the employers make offers and
the workers can accept them. Once accepted, they have to choose an effort level
e ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. The employer’s wage offer as accepted in the contract is
legally binding, whereas workers can still choose any effort level they like, that
is, they are not legally obliged to choose the requested effort level. This set-
up mimics a situation where only the employer and the worker can observe the
actual effort, but third parties cannot verify it. Thus, because the employer cannot
condition the current wage on the current effort level, effort needs to be enforced
endogenously, either by social preferences alone (in the one-shot treatment) or by
a combination of social preferences and reputation incentives (in the reputation
treatment).
In the reputation treatment, workers and employers have an identification
number which remains fixed throughout the whole 15 periods of the experi-
ment. Thus, if a worker, say W7, performs well, the employer can again make
a wage offer in the next period to W7, or he can fire the worker by not mak-
ing him a new offer. Fixed identification numbers thus imply that workers
can acquire a reputation for high performance. This reputation is “bilateral,”
however, because only the current employer knows his worker’s effort level
whereas other employers do not have this information. Thus, employers in the
reputation treatment can condition their current wage offer on the worker’s
past performance, which provides an incentive for workers to provide effort
which is not available in the one-shot treatment. In the latter, the identification
numbers are randomly reassigned every period so that no individual reputa-
tion can be acquired and employers cannot condition their new offers on past
performance.
Trust in the gift exchange game is measured by the employer’s wage offer
because this offer becomes legally binding if accepted, whereas the worker is
free to choose any feasible effort level. One can thus measure the extent to
which behavioral trust differs by observing wage levels across treatments. In
addition, because Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) elicited employers’ beliefs about
the effort level they expect, we have a separate measure of beliefs in work-
ers’ trustworthiness. Finally, we also have a measure of the workers’ actual
level of trustworthiness because we can observe the actual effort level. Note
also, that there is no reason ex ante, that is, before period 1 of the experi-
ment, to believe that there are differences in preferences or prior beliefs across
the two treatments because the subjects were randomly assigned to the treat-
ments. Thus, any emerging differences in behaviors and beliefs across treatments
must be the result of the absence or presence of the reputation formation
opportunity.
The results displayed in Figures 2a–2c show the impressive consequence of
the reputation opportunity. If workers can acquire a good reputation, some of them
do so and employers’ punish shirking by firing “bad” workers, whereas “good”
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Figure 2. (a) Employers’ beliefs in workers’ trustworthiness (measured in terms of expected effort).
(b) Employers’ behavioral trust measured in terms of actual wages. (c) Workers’ trustworthiness
measured in terms of actual effort.
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workers are rewarded with high-wage offers in the future.11 The figures show that
the reputation treatment simultaneously increases the expected trustworthiness as
measured by the expected average effort (Figure 2a), behavioral trust measured
by average wages (Figure 2b), and actual trustworthiness measured by actual
average effort (Figure 2c). It is also remarkable how strongly these three variables
are correlated over time. Behavioral trust, believed trustworthiness, and actual
trustworthiness all increase over time in the reputation treatment, until they reach
a peak in period 13 and decline thereafter. In contrast, all three variables in the
one-shot treatment decline initially until they stabilize at a baseline level.
Because of randomization to treatments, there can be no doubt that the infor-
mal reputation formation institution is the ultimate driver of behavioral trust,
beliefs about trustworthiness, and actual trustworthiness. However, imagine an
outside observer who does not know that the treatment difference is due to a dif-
ference in informal institutions. Such an observer may erroneously conclude that
the higher trust in the reputation treatment is the ultimate cause for higher effort
and higher output.
8. Causal Effects of Trust?
A researcher interested in examining the causal impact of trust on economic out-
comes such as investment, trading volume, gains from trade, or economic growth
is in the position of an observer who typically lacks information about the details
of informal institutions and norms. Such institutions and norms can depend on
seemingly minor details such as people’s spatial mobility or the existence of a
citizen registry that enables principals to find out where they can find agents. How-
ever, because informal institutions are likely to shape trust strongly, and because
of the largely unknown interactions between formal and informal institutions,
assessing the causal role of trust in field data becomes extremely difficult.
Trust measures are endogenous, regardless of how one measures them. Both
behavioral measures of trust taken from a nationally representative trust game and
survey measures of trust are equally subject to the endogeneity problem because
subjects’ beliefs about the prevailing trustworthiness affect both measures. These
beliefs, in turn, are likely to be affected by people’s experiences about others’
trustworthiness, which in turn are very likely to be influenced by formal and
informal institutions.
11. Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) show that these behaviors arise from an interaction between
fairness preferences and reputation incentives. Note that because it is common knowledge that the
experiment lasts 15 periods, backward induction rules out the possibility of reputation formation if
all subjects are purely selfish. But if a heterogeneous mix of fair and selfish types exists, equilibria
with reputation formation, in which the selfish types mimic the fair types in all periods but the last
one, become possible.
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The most common strategy for solving such endogeneity problems is using
instrumental variables. In the seminal paper by Knack and Keefer (1997), for
example, the authors instrument “trust” in a two-stage least squares approach
to explain average annual growth rates in GDP across 29 countries. They use a
variable that indicates ethno-linguistic homogeneity in a country (the percentage
of a country’s population belonging to the largest ethno-linguistic group) and the
number of law students in 1963 (as a percentage of all postsecondary students)
as instruments. It is plausible that a more homogeneous population exhibits more
trust; likewise, a higher percentage of law students may indicate more need for
lawyers because of problems with legal institutions. Thus, both variables pass
the easy part of the test for valid instruments: They are correlated with trust
as measured in the World Values survey. However, it is also easy to construct
arguments why both variables violate the second condition for a valid instrument,
that is, why they are probably correlated with the error term in the growth rate
regression: A population that is more ethno-linguistically homogenous is likely
to be associated with denser social networks that simplify communication and
trade. In addition, it may be associated with a higher degree of impartiality in the
legal enforcement of property rights and contracts because discrimination across
groups plays less of a role. All these factors may thus plausibly have a direct
impact on growth, invalidating this instrument. Likewise, if a higher percentage
of law students indicates problems in the legal enforcement of property rights
and contracts and the absence of effective social norms, this variable is likely
to have a direct impact on growth. It is also noteworthy that the use of lagged
variables does not solve the problem because the lack of contract enforcement
and beneficial informal social norms is a long term phenomenon likely to be
associated with large hysteresis effects. Thus bad legal enforcement in 1963 is
likely to be correlated with bad legal enforcement decades later.12 Taken together,
these objections against the instruments suffice in questioning the claimed causal
role of trust for GDP growth rates. It seems equally possible that the trust variable
in the growth equation just captures the consequences of formal and informal
economic institutions that are not controlled for by the other available control
variables.
It is not my aim here to claim that no good instruments for trust can be found
or that trust cannot have a causal impact on economic outcomes, but with regard
to the instruments I have seen some doubt remains. Typically, the instruments
used are correlated with measures of trust, but there are also plausible arguments
supporting a direct impact on the economic outcome of interest, namely, they are
not exogenous to the error term beyond doubt. A recent study by Guiso, Sapienza,
12. Knack and Keefer (1997) also use distance to the equator as an instrument for trust. However,
distance to the equator is also correlated with a lot of climate variables (such as temperature) which
may have a direct impact on work morale, effort costs and, therefore, GDP growth.
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and Zingales (2009) has perhaps gone farthest in achieving true exogeneity. These
authors provide fascinating evidence on the role of mutual trust in trade across
countries. They use “common religion” as an instrument for mutual trust because
trading volume and mutual trust are likely to be positively correlated. This instru-
ment seems to have the advantage that it is exogenous to current trading volumes
because the commonality of religion was typically determined hundreds of years
earlier. However, it is not only important for the validity of an instrument whether
it is exogenous to the model or to the outcome variable of interest. Instead, we
must validate the hypothesis that common religion has no direct influence on
trade, an assumption that is unlikely to be true. Common religion not only influ-
ences trust, but does many other things as well, because it is probably associated
with more frequent interactions between the two countries, compared to cases
with different religions, and this may well have a direct impact on trade. For this
reason, the authors introduce a second instrument—somatic similarity between
populations—and apply a Hausman test for overidentification. Under the assump-
tion that one of the two instruments is valid (i.e., exogenous to the error term)
this test does not reject the null hypothesis that both instruments are valid. Thus,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis but we also don’t know whether it is true.
In addition, because we already have expressed doubt about “common religion”
as a valid instrument, the question is whether the instrument “somatic similarity”
is exogenous to the error term (so that the assumption of the test is met). In my
view, this could be true but even for such a sophisticated instrument one can raise
plausible doubts. It is, for example, well known that people display more altruism
towards ingroup members (Yamagishi, Jin, and Miller 1998), and they are less
likely to violate social norms if the victim of a norm violation is an ingroup mem-
ber (Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr 2006; Goette, Huffman, and Meier 2006).
Under the plausible assumption that somatic similarity is associated with ingroup
status, people will tend to be more altruistic towards others who are more similar,
and they tend to have a lower propensity to violate a norm if a similar other is
the victim of the norm violation. If this argument is true, then somatic similar-
ity between two countries may have a direct effect on trade because trade also
depends on the party’s willingness to honor social norms of contract enforcement.
The difficulty in finding valid field instrumental variables suggests that lab-
oratory experiments can be useful because they provide valid instruments more
easily. In fact, a set-up where one treatment group is induced to have a low level
of trust while the subjects in the other treatment group are induced to have a high
level of trust provides the best instrument. One can then observe the impact of
the exogenous manipulation of trust by randomly assigning subjects to the two
treatments. However, I know of no experiment that has done this.13
13. In a trivial sense, the trust game shows that trust has an economic impact because the investor’s
transfer is multiplied by a number bigger than one. Thus, higher trust is associated with a higher
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9. Possible Mechanisms Behind a Causal Role of Trust
When studying the causal role of trust for economic outcomes, considering the
potential mechanisms behind causality is useful. One obvious mechanism is that
a population that is less betrayal- and risk-averse is more likely to invest when
facing a given level of uncertainty, and more likely to trade for a given level
of imperfect contract enforcement. Likewise, less risk- and betrayal-aversion on
the part of principals is likely to lead to less waste in terms of monitoring and
policing agents. Thus, all else being equal, it seems plausible that less risk- and
betrayal-aversion, and the higher level of trust that is associated with it, lead to
more investment and trade and lower transaction costs in terms of monitoring.
However, preferences are probably not easily malleable, meaning that eco-
nomic policy cannot easily shape them. Nor is it clear whether implementing
policies that deliberately aim at shaping people’s preferences is desirable. The
other component of trust, however, namely, beliefs about other’s trustwor-
thiness, may be more easily affected. This raises the question whether it is
possible to show that trust exerts a causal impact on economic outcomes via
the belief component of trust, that is, by raising people’s beliefs about others’
trustworthiness.
The literature on gift exchange games (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993;
Brandts and Charness 2004; Charness 2004; Charness, Frechette, and Kagel 2004)
and the more recent papers on the counterproductive effects of sanctions and
other measures that constrain agents’ shirking (Bohnet, Frey, and Huck 2001;
Fehr and Falk 2002; Fehr and List 2004; Falk and Kosfeld 2006) suggest that
beliefs about others’ trustworthiness may be self-reinforcing. Principals in gift
exchange games who trust more in terms of paying higher up-front wages induce
a higher effort level on average. The literature just mentioned on the counterpro-
ductive effects of incentives also suggests that beliefs about trustworthiness can
be self-reinforcing. For example, in Fehr and List (2004), subjects (CEOs and
students) in the role of an investor have the opportunity of combining a transfer
in a modified trust game with a small credible sanction if the back-transfer does
not meet the amount requested. However, the investor can also voluntarily refrain
from using the sanctioning threat. Surprisingly, the back-transfers are significantly
lower if the investor uses the threat, perhaps because the threat is interpreted as a
hostile act to which trustees respond with lower back-transfers. A similar result
has been observed by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), who show that restrictions on
the agents’ action space can be detrimental for their average performance—
although they limit shirking of selfish agents—because they induce agents
surplus. However, this is the trivial result of the multiplication. The real question is whether higher
trust causes subsequent behaviors that justify the initially higher level of trust, and whether this
process leads to sustainable changes in economic outcomes relative to a situation with an initial low
trust level. We are currently experimenting with this possibility but have no results yet.
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with social preference (those who are in principal trustworthy) to increase
shirking.
This empirical evidence suggests that trust can be self-reinforcing.14 Prin-
cipals or investors who have pessimistic beliefs exhibit a low level of trust and
subsequently experience a low level of trustworthiness; those with optimistic
beliefs display a high level of trust and subsequently experience a high level of
trustworthiness. In fact, the principals in Falk and Kosfeld behave exactly in this
way. They experienced what they expected, so that they had no reason to change
their expectations.
Although this literature suggests that high trust can be self-reinforcing, it does
not show that it is self-reinforcing. To show the self-reinforcing nature of trust,
multiple periods are necessary in order to see whether the principals’ behavior
in the high (low) trust condition causes levels of trustworthiness that justify and
maintain the initial level of high (low) trust. I do not know any evidence supporting
this claim; in fact, if anything, there is evidence that casts doubt on this claim. In
a recent paper (Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt 2008), the ideas in Falk and Kosfeld
(2006) have been applied to a repeated one-shot gift exchange game that lasts for
15 periods: In each period, the principals make a contract offer consisting of a
wage and a requested effort level. The wage offer is a legally binding commitment
by the principal, but effort is not third-party verifiable and hence the agent is
free to choose any available effort level. However, the principal can restrict the
agent’s available effort levels from e ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10} to e ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 10}.
The restriction of the agent’s effort choices can be viewed as a reduced form
representation of an incentive and monitoring system that enforces a minimal
effort of 3. For convenience, contract offers associated with a restriction on effort
choices are called control contracts, while contracts that do not restrict the agent
are called trust contracts.
The question then is whether the principals offer generous trust contracts with
relatively high wages that appeal to the agents’ reciprocity and trustworthiness
or whether they offer control contracts with relatively low wages. It turns out
that the principals offer trust contracts in about 50% of the cases during the first
few periods, but that they converge towards low wage control contracts over
time; fewer than 20% of the contracts were trust contracts towards the end of
the experiment. We have here a case where an initial high level of trust was not
sustainable because the lack of agents’ trustworthiness did not support the initial
high level of trust.15 A similar finding was reported in Fehr and Zehnder (2008),
14. Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) show in a recent paper that trustees who know that
their investor expects a low level of trustworthiness will send back less. Thus, mistrust tends to be
self-fulfilling and high expectations tend to elicit higher back transfers. Unfortunately, the authors
do not report a correlation between behavioral trust and expectations.
15. Note that the principal’s revenue function for trust contracts was 5e (e denotes effort) whereas
for control contracts it was only 4e, compatible with the notion that monitoring and controls impose
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which examined the viability of a one-shot credit market where no third party
enforced the repayment of debt. Initially, roughly 80% of the lenders offered
credit contracts but their willingness to offer contracts declined steadily to less
than 20% due to the low repayment rate. Thus, like in the previous experiment, the
initial high level of trust was not sustainable, and behavioral trust levels gradually
declined.16
These findings suggest that proving that exogenously manipulated trust
causes different long-term outcomes may be very hard. Of course, in both exper-
iments mentioned herein, the initial high level of trust and its subsequent decline
to levels matching the prevailing level of trustworthiness temporarily caused
higher levels of trade and higher gains from trade. But this was only a temporary
phenomenon and trust ultimately converged towards rather low levels.
Currently, I see only one way in which the belief component of trust may
have causal long-term effects. If high trust equilibria and low trust equilibria
exist, initial variations in trust across groups may have long-term effects because
an initially high level of trust acts as an equilibrium selection device. However, I
know no study that provides support for this argument.
10. Conclusions
I selectively reviewed and assessed recent research on trust in this paper. My view
is based on a behavioral definition of trust. This definition highlights the impor-
tance of risk preferences, social preferences, and beliefs about other people’s
trustworthiness for trusting behavior. From an economic viewpoint, in fact, all
a burden on the agents and lower their productivity. In the context of our discussion, this feature
makes the decline of trust contracts over time even more remarkable: Although trust contracts were
more efficient in terms of “physical” productivity, the principals largely preferred control contracts.
16. The relatively rapid adaptation of trust to the prevailing levels of trustworthiness in these
experiments may seem somewhat puzzling in view of the field evidence on the persistence of trust
levels across generations (Dohmen et al. 2006; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006). For example,
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales document that the trust level of immigrants to the US are highly
correlated with trust levels in their country of origin. To the extent to which trust is based on risk
and social preferences this persistence could reflect differences in these preferences across different
types of immigrants. In fact, the paper by Dohmen et al. not only shows that trust levels between
parents and their adult children are positively correlated but that risk preferences are also positively
correlated, lending support to this interpretation. However, in principle, it is also possible that even
the belief components of trust may persist across generations. This is possible, if optimistic beliefs
are correlated with other personality characteristics or particular abilities to detect cues indicating
the level of other persons’ trustworthiness. If, for example, subjects with a generally high levels
of trust are—consciously or unconsciously—better capable of detecting untrustworthy subjects, the
high trustors are likely to self-select into relationships with trustworthy people. As a consequence,
they may experience less betrayal which reinforces their high initial level of trust. Because the
experiments described above only allow for anonymous interactions between the trading partners
such processes have been ruled out by design but in real life face-to-face interaction they may play
a role. Yamagishi (1998) and Yamagishi, Kikuchi, and Kosugi (1999) present intriguing evidence
indicating that high trustors have higher social intelligence in the sense that they are better able to
read other people’s minds and intentions.
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individual behaviors—including trusting behavior—should be captured by pref-
erences and beliefs, and there is little reason why other “determinants” of trust
(such as religiousness, for example) should play an independent role that does not
work through its effect on preferences and beliefs. However, as our measures of
trust, preferences, and beliefs are almost always imperfect, even demonstrating
that measures of beliefs and preferences are indeed significant predictors of trust
would be useful.
I have shown that risk preferences and social preferences are indeed predictors
of survey trust. This complements work by Bohnet and coauthors (2004, 2008)
and Naef et al. (2008), which show that these types of preferences play a key role
in behavioral trust as measured in the trust game. Thus, both trust measured by
survey methods and trust measured in the trust game seem to be based on risk and
social preferences. This economic approach towards trust also receives particular
vindication by the results of Naef et al., who show that measures of beliefs, risk,
and social preferences explain almost the whole trust gap between the US and
Germany.
I also reviewed experimental research that unambiguously shows that trust,
expected trustworthiness, and actual trustworthiness are endogenous variables
shaped by formal or informal institutions. This endogeneity problem is a major
obstacle that inhibits the provision of fully convincing evidence for a causal role
of trust. Despite recent progress in finding sophisticated instrumental variables
for trust, it is in my view still plausible that trust is simply an epiphenomenon of
the institutional environment, that is, it may not cause lasting effects on important
economic outcomes such as the volume of trade, investment, or reliance on moni-
toring technologies. However, the economic approach towards trust also provides
suggestions of how a causal role of trust could be established experimentally. The
most convincing strategy seems to be to induce optimistic or pessimistic beliefs
about other people’s trustworthiness exogenously and observe whether this leads
to interesting and lasting changes in behaviors and economic outcomes.
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